These coding rules represent crises in essentially the same way that the model summarized here does.1 Second, Huth and Russett have measures for the relative military capabilities of the challenger, defender, and protege, and on the extent of the defender's interest in the protege.
Finally, the data are well suited for asking about the effects of threats made in international crises and for comparing hypotheses derived from the gametheoretic approach to older and more mainstream arguments. Huth and Russett (1988) and Huth (1988b) used the data to test a number of hypotheses on the conditions under which a defender's "immediate deterrent" threat is most likely to succeed or fail-that is, what predicts whether the challenging state acted or did not act on its initial threat against the protege? Most of their hypotheses are based on informal rationalist arguments about the impact of the balance of capabilities and the balance of interests on the credibility of a threat. The central idea is that the defender's deterrent threat should be more likely to succeed the more the defender is favored by the balance of capabilities or interests. This idea is both highly intuitive and widely accepted by students of international politics (Fearon 1992 
, chap. 2).
The game-theoretic analysis sketched below substantially revises and qualifies these claims about the effects of relative power and relative interests in crisis bargaining. The main problem with the standard arguments is that they do not grasp the consequences of strategic dynamics linked to the fact that crises are sequences of decisions to threaten or escalate. In particular, the full empirical implications of strategic behavior by challenging states is missed. To the extent that relative capabilities and interests are observable before a crisis begins, rational challengers should take these into account. When the observable balance of interests favors the defender, only relatively resolved challengers will choose to threaten, implying that the defender's effort at immediate deterrence will be relatively unlikely to succeed (contrary to the standard hypothesis). When the observable balance of capabilities favors the defender, challenges will tend to occur on issues that are of initially doubtful interest to the defender. Hence a strong deterrent signal by the defender will be relatively likely to work in response, but due to the challenger's initial beliefs and choice of issue rather than (directly) due to the defender's superior military power.
Taken to the data, these hypotheses fare quite well (although there is one variable that acts anomalously) and yield an interpretation of the evidence quite different from that based on the standard balance of capabilities and 1. For more extended theoretical treatments of the model employed in this article, see Fearon (1990 Fearon ( , 1992 ; for a more general formulation, see Fearon (forthcoming-a). interest hypotheses. In brief, relative power and relative interests influence the effects of threats made in international confrontations, but in ways different and more subtle than the mainstream arguments envision.
The article proceeds in four sections. In the first, I briefly introduce the crisis bargaining model behind the empirical analysis. The second section considers some testable hypotheses based on equilibrium analysis of the model. In the third section, I reanalyze and reinterpret Huth and Russett's (1988) data on immediate deterrence in light of the game-theoretic arguments and hypotheses. A fourth section concludes.
A SIGNALING MODEL OF CRISIS BARGAINING
Since George and Smoke (1974) , empirical work on international crises has emphasized that they are sequential in nature-one state challenges, the other responds, the first replies again, and so on until either war, capitulation, or some settlement is reached. This section presents and analyzes a model of a crisis as a four-step sequence. A challenger and a defender alternate in making threats or warnings; each begins the crisis uncertain about the adversary's willingness to fight over the issues at stake. Because the focus of the article is empirical and to save space, I do not fully characterize equilibrium results for the game (see Fearon 1990 Fearon , 1992 , chap. 4).
The structure of the crisis. The model depicts crises as having four principal stages or steps, as illustrated in Figure 1 . In the first step, the challenger considers whether to take an action that explicitly or implicitly threatens another state. If the challenger decides not to threaten, the status quo prevails. If threatened, the defender chooses in the second step whether to respond with some threat or warning of its own. The response might be an action such as mobilization, a public declaration of intent to resist if the challenger chooses to act on its threat, or a declaration of intent to restore the status quo ante if the challenger has already begun changing the status quo.
In the third step, after observing the defender's response, the challenger chooses whether or not to act on its initial threat, or to continue if it had already begun. If the challenger chooses not to act, the crisis ends. Finally, in the fourth step, if the challenger acts, the defender chooses whether or not to resist with military force.
The model is much simpler than any particular historical case of crisis bargaining. In the real world, states have opportunities to send a greater variety of messages to each other through multiple channels; the choices of Huth and Russett (1984 ,1988 ,1993 , Huth (1988b, 20-25) , and Lebow and Stein (1990b) . It also captures, in a natural way, a conceptual distinction that has played a major role in recent empirical studies of crisis bargaining. Morgan (1977, chap. 2) distinguished between general deterrence-which holds if no threats are issued between states that are involved in a generally adversarial relationship-and immediate deterrence-which becomes an issue after one state has decided to threaten or to take other actions that suggest the possible use of force. This distinction presupposes a sequential, step-by-step pattern for crisis bargaining like that represented in Figure 1 . There, general deterrence fails if the challenger decides to threaten rather than accept the status quo. Immediate deterrence fails if the challenger acts on its initial threat after observing a tough response by the defender, such as mobilization. I have argued elsewhere that in most crises, threatening or making a "show of force" generates audience costs that a leader might suffer if he backed down later (Fearon 1990 (Fearon , 1992 , forthcoming-a). These costs arise from the action of domestic political audiences concerned with whether the leadership is successful or unsuccessful at foreign policy. In the game, if the challenger backs down after the defender mobilizes, it will suffer an audience cost rc > 0, whereas the defender enjoys a "foreign policy success" worth rD > 0.
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Payoffs are then (-rc, rD). If the challenger backs down when no show of force has been made, it bears a small cost z, whereas the defender reaps a small benefit z, where 0 -z < rc. So (-z, z) results.2 Finally, if the defender backs down after it has mobilized and after action taken by the challenger, it loses the value of the issue at stake, aD > 0, along with its audience cost rD. Conversely, the challenger gains ac > 0, its intrinsic value for whatever is at stake, plus rc, the extra benefit of having successfully stood up to the defender's attempt at "immediate deterrence." Payoffs for this outcome are (ac + rc, -aD -rD). On the other hand, if the defender backs down without having made a show of force, it suffers only the loss of the issue at stake, and the challenger receives only its value for the issue itself. Thus payoffs are (ac, -aD).
To summarize, three key variables define the states' preferences over the several possible crisis outcomes: the states' values for the issues at stake in the dispute (ac and aD); the audience costs created by public displays of force (rc and rD); and the states' values for the war outcome (wc and wD). Each of these values is defined relative to a player's value for the status quo, which is normalized to equal 0.
Equilibrium with incomplete information about values for war. When all of the above payoffs are common knowledge, the game has three possible subgame perfect outcomes depending on the states' values for war. Either the challenger accepts the status quo; the challenger threatens and the defender cedes the issue at stake without resistance; or war occurs after mobilization by the defender. So, with complete information, the defender's counterthreat fails whenever it is actually made-challengers can anticipate the defender's actions and so will not threaten expecting resistance unless they are themselves willing to go to war. The question, "When do deterrent threats work?" becomes interesting only when we bring incomplete information into the picture: if challengers are uncertain about the defender's true willingness to fight over the issues in question, then there is a potential role for the defender's counterthreat to "signal resolve" to a challenger, so dissuading further aggressive action.
To model uncertainty of this sort, we suppose that before the crisis begins, the states' expected utilities for war, wc and WD, are distributed uniformly on the intervals [-j, ac] and [-k, 0], respectively. At the outset, challenger and defender are informed of their own value for war, wc and wD, but know only the distribution of their adversary's value. Thus the distribution of WD on [-k, 0] represents the challenger's initial belief, or uncertainty, about the defender's willingness to fight, whereas the distribution of wc on [-j, ac] represents the defender's initial belief about the challenger's value for war. The parametersj and k (with k taken to be greater than aD and both as common knowledge) determine the nature of the states' initial beliefs: the larger j or k, the greater the initial belief that the challenger or defender probably has a low willingness to go to war over the issues at stake.3 So defined, the game proves to have a unique sequential equilibrium distribution on outcomes for any set of parameter values. Equilibrium is characterized by piecemeal or step-by-step separation of states according to their privately known values for conflict. Relatively tough challengers (i.e., high wc) choose to threaten and then act on their threat. Relatively tough defenders choose to mobilize against a threat and then fight back if the challenger acts. Challengers with lower values for conflict choose either not to threaten or to try a limited probe-to threaten and then back off if they encounter an immediate deterrent threat by the defender. Defenders with lower willingness to fight choose either not to offer resistance to a threat or to try immediate deterrence and then back down if it fails.
A crisis in the incomplete-information game thus appears as a succession of "costly signals" that allow states to learn about their adversary's true willingness to use military force.4 On seeing mobilization by the defender, the challenger correctly increases its belief that the defender might in fact be willing to use force. The reason is that tough defenders are more likely to mobilize than weak defenders because tough defenders do not have to worry about paying audience costs for backing down-they prefer to go to war if it comes to this. However, although learning does take place, it is not necessarily complete. On seeing a threat, the defender will typically be unable to tell with certainty whether immediate deterrence will succeed or fail if tried. Likewise, on seeing an immediate deterrent threat by the defender, the challenger may not be able to judge whether the defender would actually be willing to use force on behalf of the protge'.
3. An alternative specification would have the states uncertain about the adversary's value for the issue (ac and aD), while values for war were common knowledge. The same qualitative results hold, at least for the case of one-sided incomplete information (challenger's value for conflict is known). I use the more complicated case of two-sided incomplete information here to make possible challenger self-selection into crises by type (wc).
4. On costly signals, see Spence (1973) and Fearon (1992) for discussion of signaling in international crises. The costs that make signaling informative in this model differ somewhat from the "classical" costly signals of Spence. In the classical case, the act of sending the signal is itself costly, whereas here it is the act of backing down after it has been sent that is costly. The term "bridge burning signals" has been suggested, but with incomplete information the receiver may be unsure whether the bridge is really burned.
Even so, states in the model can form expectations about the likelihood that their threats or counterthreats will succeed, and in equilibrium these probabilistic estimates are accurate. We can use these equilibrium probability estimates from the model to derive hypotheses on when threats used in crises are more or less likely to succeed. In particular, equilibrium results allow us to ask how the probability of immediate deterrence success-that is, the probability that the challenger backs down after seeing a deterrent threat by the defender-varies with the several parameters of the model.
In the next section, I develop and intrepret some of these results on the effects of crisis threats, contrasting them with the "mainstream rationalist theories" that dominate the literature.
COMPARATIVE STATICS AND HYPOTHESES ON IMMEDIATE DETERRENCE
Mainstream rationalist theories characterize international crises as contests decided by a critical factor-the side with more military capabilities, more resolve, or stronger intrinsic interests is predicted to prevail. Although the logic is not always spelled out, these arguments are typically defended in rationalist terms. The core idea is that (1) having more of the relevant critical factor (capabilities, resolve, etc.) allows a state to make a more credible threat to escalate a crisis to military conflict, and that (2) the side not favored by the balance of the critical factor will realize its disadvantage and so is more likely to back down.5
In their work on immediate deterrence, Huth and Russett (1984, 1988 ) and Huth (1988b) base most of their hypotheses on these arguments. In operational terms, they predict that, first, the greater the ratio of the defender's capabilities to the challenger's, the more likely is an immediate deterrent threat to succeed. Second, they argue that the stronger the defender's level of interest in the protege, the greater the chance of immediate deterrence success. I will refer to the twin claims that (a) a favorable balance of capabilities, and (b) a favorable balance of interests improve the prospects for immediate deterrence success as the mainstream hypothesis. Note that neither this hypothesis nor the argument from which it derives predicts any difference between general and immediate deterrence concerning the effect of the balance of capabilities or interests. Nor does it suggest any distinction between indicators of capabilities or interests that are available before the crisis begins, and information that emerges after the initial threat, in the course of the crisis.
Equilibrium results for the model outlined above suggest an alternative specification. In particular, comparative statics analysis draws attention to the importance of states' prior beliefs about their adversaries' willingness to use force. If crises are characterized by private information and costly signaling, then states will "select themselves" into or out of crises according to these prior beliefs, and this fact will have implications for subsequent inferences and choices. One consequence is that rationalist hypotheses that are true for general deterrence may be exactly reversed for immediate deterrence. For related reasons, information about, say, the balance of interests, may have a different impact on the probability of immediate deterrence success depending on whether it is known ex ante (before the initial threat) or ex post (after the initial threat).
In brief, equilibrium results indicate that the challenger's prior expectation that the defender prefers fighting to conceding the issue (aJk, in the model) will significantly influence the probability of both general and immediate deterrence success, although in opposite directions. The more the challenger initially expects the defender to prefer war to conceding the issue (the larger aD/k), the more likely is general deterrence to succeed, other things equal. But if general deterrence does fail, immediate deterrence will then be less likely to succeed, despite the defender's initial credibility. By the same token, if the challenger initially expected that the defender would probably prefer concessions to war, then general deterrence will be less likely to succeed, but subsequent efforts at immediate deterrence will be more likely to work.
The reason is that rational challengers will select themselves into a crisis according to their beliefs about the defender's preference for war versus concessions, and will do so in a manner that influences the probability of immediate deterrence success (Fearon forthcoming-b). When the defender is initially expected to prefer war to backing down, only highly motivated, hard-to-deter challengers (high wc) will choose to threaten in the first place. When the defender is initially expected to probably prefer concessions to war, then the incentive for "opportunistic," probing challenges is increased; in this set of cases (low aJk), the challengers will tend on average to have low values for conflict and so will be relatively easily dissuaded by an immediate deterrent threat.6
One major implication is that empirical evaluations of immediate deterrence ought to specify whether information about relative interests or capabilities is available before or after the initial challenge. Consider a measure of the defender's interest in the protege that is available ex ante-for example, the presence of an alliance between the two. We would expect such a measure to be positively related to the challenger's prior belief that the defender might be willing to use force on behalf of the protege. Thus it should have a positive impact on the likelihood of general deterrence success, but a negative impact on immediate deterrence-challengers who threaten proteges with allies will, on average, be more highly motivated and less deterrable.7 By contrast, information about the defender's commitment to the protege that emerges after an initial threat obviously cannot influence the challenger's prior beliefs or general deterrence. It would, however, be expected to influence positively the likelihood that an immediate deterrent threat would work.8 This argument is summarized in hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: Measures of the strength of the defender's interest in the proteg6
that are available before a crisis begins should be related to general deterrence success, but to immediate deterrence failure. Measures of defender interest revealed during a crisis should be related to immediate deterrence success.
Understanding how, by this theory, a measure of the balance of capabilities will be related to immediate deterrence is more involved. It is natural to suppose that the more the ex ante balance of forces favors the defender, the greater will be the challenger's prior belief that the defender might be willing to use force, for a given issue aD.9 If this were the only effect of the balance 6. In the model, the equilibrium probability that the challenger will act on its initial threat (conditional on a threat followed by mobilization) weakly increases as aD/k increases. See Fearon (1990 Fearon ( , 1992 , chap. 4) for details. An equivalent result emerges in a more general model (Fearon forthcoming-a) that allows for an arbitrary distribution of states' values for war: a rightward shift in the distribution of a state's possible values for war increases the chance that its opponent will not escalate the dispute, but it also increases the chance that the opponent will not back down if it does choose to escalate.
7. Huth and Russett (1984) reported a negative effect of alliance ties on immediate deterrence success and gave a brief "selection effect" explanation. See, also, Huth and Russett (1993).
8. In the model, for example, the information revealed when the defender mobilizes lowers the probability that the challenger will act on its threat. It can be shown that if the defender chooses not to mobilize in response to a threat, the challenger will always act and the defender will not resist (Fearon 1990 , lemma 1).
9. In the model, increasing relative capabilities in favor of the defender means shifting the distribution of the defender's values for conflict (wD) upward while shifting the distribution of challenger values (wc) downward. of forces on prior beliefs, then we would make the same prediction as for measures of the balance of interests: ex ante indicators of relative capabilities should be related to general deterrence success, but immediate deterrence failure, while ex post indicators should be related to immediate deterrence success.
However, prior expectations about the balance of forces will also influence the interests on which challengers will choose to threaten. For example, in the model the probability that a militarily tough defender will be threatened on an important issue (large aD) is lower than the probability that this defender would be challenged on an issue of lesser importance. Intuitively, a state not favored by the balance of capabilities will be reluctant to challenge a vital interest of the defender. Ex ante measures of the balance of capabilities will thus be related to the stakes of a dispute, ac and aD, in a way that affects the chances for immediate deterrence success. The more the ex ante balance favors the defender, the less likely a challenge on a vital interest; hence the lower the expectation that the defender will prefer war to concessions; hence a greater chance of immediate deterrence success. If the choice of issue by the challenger is endogenous, then across cases, observable measures of the defender's relative military strength will be related to the success of immediate deterrent threats.10
Thus the ultimate prediction is the same as that given by the mainstream hypothesis: the more the (ex ante observable) balance of forces favors the defender, the more likely is the defender's threat to work. However, the reasoning behind the prediction is quite different. In the mainstream theory the challenger belatedly recognizes that it has inferior military capabilities, and so backs down. In the signaling model, issues and strategic behavior, rather than relative capabilities per se, drive the result. The challenger is more likely to back down when not favored by the military balance because it is more likely to challenge when it is highly uncertain about the defender's willingness to respond, as summarized by hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: The more the ex ante balance of capabilities favors the defender, the more challengers will threaten only on issues of dubious importance to the defender, and in consequence, the more likely is a costly signal (an immediate deterrent threat) to succeed. Ex post measures of the relative military strength 10. Ideally, the choice of issue by the challenger should be made endogenous in the model, rather than deducing the effects of relative power on issue selection from comparative statics. An appropriate modification of the model given above is to allow the challenger to select a = aC = aD in the first step of the crisis. In the case of one-sided incomplete information (the defender's value for conflict is privately known), the proposition given in the text holds: The more the observable balance of capabilities favors the defender, the smaller the initial demand a by the challenger, and the greater the probability of immediate deterrent success. Two-sided incomplete information introduces refinements-related complications that I consider in work in progress. For another crisis bargaining model that has the property that greater relative power by the defender reduces the equilibrium demands made of it, see Fearon (1992, chap. 1). of the defender revealed during a crisis should also increase the chance of immediate deterrent success.
So far, I have focused on the distinction between ex ante and ex post measures of relative capabilities or interests, and how these should be expected to influence the outcomes of the defender's threats. Ex ante measures, I have argued, influence immediate deterrence via their influence on the challenging state's prior beliefs about the defender's resolve.
Another important influence on the challenger's prior beliefs is the history of relations between defender and challenger. If there was a previous crisis between the two, this implies that there is at least one issue between them on which both have high enough values for conflict to lead them to incur the costs and risks of crisis bargaining. In the equilibrium of the signaling game, states with the lowest values for conflict on an issue either do not challenge or do not respond with a costly signal if challenged. Thus a previous confrontation may reveal something about the states' private information: regardless of which side backed down, the mere fact that there was a resisted challenge means that the states involved have higher than expected values for conflict on some issue. It suggests, further, that any subsequent challenge will be made with a higher than usual initial belief that the defender would be willing to resist." So if we compare a set of crises between states that had no prior conflict to a set in which the states involved did have some prior conflict, we should expect immediate deterrence to be less likely to work in the second set. A first crisis reveals information about the states' values for conflict, and this implies that a second challenge will be made with an initial belief about the chance of resistance that is on average higher than in cases without a prior conflict. Hypothesis 3 follows. Hypothesis 3: Immediate deterrent threats will be less likely to succeed in crises between adversaries who faced each other in a previous crisis.
A REASSESSMENT OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON IMMEDIATE DETERRENCE
This section uses the hypotheses and arguments given above to reevaluate Huth and Russett's (1984, 1988) Huth hypothesizes that the long-term balance will influence the challenger's calculations concerning a possible war of attrition, whereas the immediate and short-term balances will shape its considerations concerning a blitzkrieg or a limited-aims strategy. Further, because the consensus is that militaries prefer the offensive-and wish strongly to avoid wars of attrition, Huth (1988b) expects that "The immediate and short-term balance of military forces will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than will the long-term balance of forces" (p. 41).
For the final element of the military balance-the defender's nuclear status-Huth (1988b, 42) originally argued that nuclear weapons should not be expected to influence immediate deterrence outcomes because the threat to use them is incredible, at least for cases of extended deterrence. A "combination of salient political, military, and ethical questions about the immediate and long-term consequences of nuclear use by the defender against a non-nuclear power raise serious doubts as to the credibility of such a decision" (1988a, 428) . This is a mainstream rationalist argument: more credible threats are more likely to succeed.
In the 1988 data analysis, all of Huth's expectations about the balance of capability measures were born out. Immediate deterrence appeared significantly more likely to succeed the more the immediate and short-term balance favored the defender. By contrast, the effects of the long-term balance and nuclear weapons on immediate deterrence could not be reliably distinguished from zero. In a later article, Huth (1990) altered his model specification to include interactive effects and then found evidence that possession of nuclear weapons had a significant positive impact on immediate deterrence success. He explained the finding with the suggestion that, due to psychological biases, nuclear threats may be more credible to leaders than they rationally ought to be (pp. 272-73).
Reassessment
The hypotheses and arguments drawn from the signaling model suggest a different interpretation of these results. Whereas Huth distinguishes among his measures on the basis of hypothesized military and political attributes of the capabilities, I have argued that the distinction between ex ante and ex post measures is at least as important. As in the mainstream hypothesis, both ex ante and ex post measures of the ratio of defender to challenger forces should be positively related to immediate deterrence success. But the proposed mechanism differs. An ex post measure such as the immediate balance-the local balance of forces after the defender has responded to the challenger's initial threat-reflects new information about the defender's willingness to resist and also how effectively it would be able to resist. By contrast, ex ante measures such as the long-and short-term balances and the defender's nuclear status will be related to immediate deterrence success because they will act as proxies for the challenger's initial beliefs about the defender. When any of these balances strongly favors the defender, threats will most often have been made with the initial belief that the defender was probably not willing to use force on the issue. Hence a costly signal in response will be comparatively likely to succeed.
Evidence for this latter interpretation can be seen by looking at how the short-term balance variable divides up the cases in Huth and Russett's (1988) sample. This variable is constructed as a ratio of mobilization capacities, based on the states' "standing ground and air forces and first class of trained reserves" (Huth 1988a, 432) . Table 1 lists the set of cases in which the ratio is above average for the sample (thus in favor of the defender), along with the deterrence outcome. It is striking-although, on reflection, unsurprising-that the defenders in this list are predominantly major powers whereas the challengers are predominantly minor powers. For the whole data set, the short-term balance is above average for 15 of the 20 minor-major crises (75%), whereas it is above average for only 4 of the 38 remaining cases (11%).12 12. In a minor-major crisis, the challenger is a minor power and the defender a major power. In addition, note that the list in Table 1 Thinking about the cases on the list suggests that the short-term balance is separating out a set in which observably weaker challengers are making limited probes, highly uncertain about a more powerful defender's willingness to use force. If so, then the defender's immediate deterrent threat is more likely to succeed in these cases not because of ex ante misperception of the defender's ability to blunt a rapid offensive, but rather due to the challenger's prior expectations concerning the defender's response. The short-term balance may be proxying for initial beliefs about the defender's willingness to use force on the issue.
Examining how deterrence outcomes vary with minor-major status of challenger and defender reveals a striking pattern consistent with this argument. The set of minor-major cases-challenger is a minor power, defender is a major power-is listed along with the effect of the defender's threat in Table 2 square is 12.4). Moreover, minor-major status is more strongly correlated with immediate deterrence success than either the long-term balance or the short-term balance and remains the only significant variable in a logistic regression with deterrence outcome as the dependent variable, including the other military balance variables as independent variables. The empirical pattern is striking: over the past 100 years, extended immediate deterrence almost always worked when applied by a major against a minor power. To explain this pattern as the result of consistent ex ante misperception of the relevant military balance by minor power challengers is possible, but implausible. It requires us to believe that minor power challengers systematically fail to recognize that their major power adversaries possess superior forces and then suddenly realize this fact after the defender responds.
If this were the explanation, then we might also find a set of cases in which minor powers resist challenges by major powers. Systematic misperception should lead some minor powers to resist threats in which they subsequently realize they will have to acquiesce. But despite the fact that major powers have much more active foreign policies than minor powers, there is only one major-minor dispute in the data set.14 Turning to the effect of nuclear weapons on immediate deterrence, we find a sharper difference between the two theories. Hypothesis 1 predicts that as an ex ante indicator, possession of nuclear weapons by the defender should be related to immediate deterrence success. As with the short-term balance, a nuclear-armed state will tend not to be threatened on issues known to be of major importance to it; thus we should find nuclear-armed defenders' immediate deterrent threats working more often. By contrast, Huth (1988b) originally argued that possession of nuclear weapons will not make immediate deterrence more likely to work because the nuclear threat will be incredible in most extended deterrence crises.
Huth's empirical results appeared at first glance to support his original hypothesis. When included in his "most powerful equation," a dummy variable coded 1 when the defender has nuclear weapons is not statistically significant at the .05 level used as a cut-off (Table 3).15 Note, however, that the estimated effect of having nuclear weapons is positive and respectably large. The nuclear variable was discarded essentially because the standard error of its coefficient is also somewhat large-there is a slightly less than one-in-five chance that a coefficient of this size would appear if in fact nuclear weapons had no effect on immediate deterrence.
It is not hard to see why this standard error is as large as it is: nuclear weapons existed only after 1944 and were possessed by the defender in only 15 of the 58 cases in the sample. Because the dummy variable does not vary much, logistic regression produces an unbiased but relatively uncertain estimate. In essence, in the 1988 analysis Huth discarded the nuclear weapons variable for lack of information rather than evidence that nuclear weapons do not affect immediate deterrence.
What evidence there is supports the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship.16 Because nuclear weapons were simply not available before 1945, it seems reasonable to focus on the postwar cases. In this set (N = 24), 14. And this dispute is a 1911 conflict between Italy and Turkey-one can reasonably question Italy's major power status at this time.
Minor power leaders may tend to have lower domestic political audience costs for backing out of a crisis (Fearon 1992, forthcoming-a) . If so, then this may be another reason for the high rate of immediate deterrence success when applied by major against minor powers. In the model, if minor power signaling costs are low, opportunistic challenges are made worthwhile even given initial beliefs about the likelihood of resistance that would lead a state with higher audience costs to shy away.
15. The definition of several of the control variables in this equation will be discussed below. 16. As noted above, Huth reaches this same conclusion via a different route in his 1990 paper. To get a sense of what lies behind the relatively strong correlation between nuclear status and immediate deterrence, it is helpful to look more directly at the postwar cases. In these, immediate deterrence worked 80% of the time when defenders had nuclear weapons (12 of 15) and only 22% of the time when they did not (2 of 9 cases; this distribution would arise by chance in less than 1 out of 100 samples). Table 4 lists the postwar cases and results of the defender's threat, according to the defender's nuclear status. Comparing the nuclear and nonnuclear sets reveals a fairly clear difference. When the defender had nuclear weapons, challenges tended to be probes on peripheral and often far-away interests. For example, in only 1 of 15 cases did a nuclear defender share a common border with the threatened protege. By contrast, when the defender did not have nuclear weapons, crises more often concerned issues expected to be important to challenger and defender alike. In 5 out of the 9 cases, nonnuclear defenders were contiguous with the threatened protege.
Diplomatic historical work on these crises would also seem to support the view that challenges to proteges of nuclear defenders were rarely made with 17. The same results can be seen in logistic regression of deterrence outcome on these variables: the dummy variable for nuclear status has the largest coefficient and the largest t ratio. However, because there are so few data, none of the coefficients are significant at the .10 level. (It is somewhat reassuring that the estimated effects are not very unstable.) Table 4 , we find at most two in which there is any possibility that a nuclear threat by the defender persuaded to the challenger to back off (Berlin and Quemoy-Matsu; Betts 1987). So how could it be that nuclear weapons affect the likelihood of immediate deterrent success? This initially intuitive argument misses the strategic consequences of the fact that challengers select themselves according to their prior beliefs about the defender's willingness to resist. Immediate deterrent threats by nuclear states are comparatively likely to work because such states are less likely to have been challenged on issues expected to be of major importance to them.
THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS AND THE EFFECTS OF THREATS
To gauge the effect of the balance of interests on immediate deterrence success, Huth (1988b) employs six measures. These are all ex ante indicators, observable by the states prior to the challenger's initial threat. Three are argued to reflect the strength of the defender's tie to the protege state: whether defender and protege have a military alliance; the level of arms transfers from defender to protege; and the level of foreign trade between them. Huth hypothesizes that the presence of an alliance, more arms transfers, and more trade should each be associated with a greater chance of immediate deterrence success (pp. 44-46). 'Ihree other measures are said to reflect the strength of the challenger's interest in the protege: whether challenger and prot6ge are contiguous; the population of the protege; and whether the prot6ge is a source of strategic raw materials for the challenger. Contiguity, a larger population, and source of strategic materials are all predicted to make immediate deterrence less likely to succeed because the challenger is argued in each case to have a greater interest in control of the prot6ge (Huth 1988b, 46-48).19 18. See citations and discussion in Fearon (1992, chap. 6). 19. At least by the arguments given in Huth (1988b), it is not clear why we should not expect that these variables would be equally valid as measures of the defender's interest in the protege. More generally, the criteria for selecting which interest measures should apply to the defender and which to the challenger are unclear.
In contrast to the balance of capability variables, Huth's data analysis does not support prior expectations concerning the ex ante balance of interest variables. None of the six measures has an effect on the likelihood of immediate deterrence success that can be reliably distinguished from zero.
This contrasts with the results of Huth and Russett's (1984) first study, in which some of the relative interest variables were found to be statistically significant. Huth (1988b) conjectures that the inclusion of new indicators measuring the defender's bargaining behavior renders the ex ante interest variables insignificant (p. 83). The suggestion is that how the defender responds to the challenge is probably a more reliable signal of interest than an indirect measure such as trade or arms transfers. Huth's two measures of defender bargaining behavior are both strongly related to immediate deterrent success. These comprise a variable coded 1 when the defender adopted a tit-for-tat military response to the challenger, and a variable coded 1 when the defender's diplomatic posture was firm-but-flexible rather than bullying or conciliatory. Note that from the perspective developed here, these are both ex post measures of defender interest in the protege (they are not known prior to the challenger's threat).
Reassessment
The signaling theory agrees with the mainstream hypothesis concerning ex post measures of defender interest in the protege: if the use of tit-for-tat military responses and/or a firm-but-flexible diplomatic posture reveals new information about the defender's level of interest, these measures should be related to immediate deterrence success, as they are in this data set (see Maoz 1983 for similar results using a different data set).
Predictions differ, however, concerning the ex ante measures. Whereas mainstream rationalist arguments see no reason to treat ex ante and ex post interest measures differently, the signaling theory suggests that ex ante measures of the defender's commitment to the protege should be related to general deterrence success, but immediate deterrence failure (hypothesis 1). More generally, the signaling theory implies (1) any measure of the defender's interest in the protege that predicts that the defender would actually fight should be related to immediate deterrence failure, and (2) any measure of the defender's interest that predicts the defender will not fight should be related to immediate deterrence success.
What evidence there is tends to support these two hypotheses-although, as in the case of nuclear weapons, there are not many data, and there is also one anomalous finding.
To see this, consider first that if an ex ante measure of the defender's level of interest in the protege is a good one, it ought to predict whether the defender will fight on behalf of the protge6. Thus we can empirically evaluate balance of interest measures by examining whether they predict the use of force by the defender in the set of cases where immediate deterrence failed. For this set, Table 5 With the notable exception of arms transfers, the measures are positively correlated with the defender's decision to fight, as one would expect and hope. The signaling theory predicts that these signs should all reverse when the same variables are correlated with the immediate deterrence outcome (the challenger's decision to back off or press ahead with its threat). An ex ante measure that predicts the defender's decision to fight (not fight) should be related to immediate deterrence failure (success). Table 6 reports these correlations between the four measures of defender interest in the protege and immediate deterrence outcome (1 = success, 0 = failure). The predicted reversals occur for three of the variables (alliance, arms, and contiguity), whereas the sign moves toward zero for the fourth (trade). Excepting the trade variable, these signs remain the same in the fully specified logit model with immediate deterrence outcome as the dependent variable (Table 7) .
To summarize these results verbally, the predicted sign reversals occur for three of the four measures. Two of these three interest measures are positively related to the defender's decision to fight but negatively affect immediate deterrence. Immediate deterrence is significantly less likely to work when protege and defender have an alliance, and the same appears true if defender and protege are geographically close, although the level of statistical confidence is lower.
The third variable, arms transfers to the protege, is related to immediate deterrence success at the same time as it predicts that the defender will not fight. This is as anticipated by the theory: if defenders are less likely to be willing to resist with force in the cases where arms transfers are relatively high, then we should observe more opportunistic challenges in these cases (i.e., challengers with lower values for wc on average), and thus more successful immediate deterrent threats. The puzzle is why higher arms transfers are related to decisions not to fight for the protege. The small number 20. My only reservation about this interpretation is that all of these measures (alliance, trade, arms transfers, contiguity) are incredibly crude and noisy compared to the specific ex ante information available to state leaders in each particular case. I would expect that such specific information would in every case allow a sharper estimate of the defender's response than would a regression formula using these crude measures. Thus, even though I would not be at all surprised if systematic misperception along these lines did occur, I would be surprised if it were picked up by such crude measures. Huth offers two hypotheses concerning these variables. First, following Jervis's (1976, 239) argument that state leaders are more influenced by events that they experience firsthand, he proposes that "The past behavior of the defender in confrontations in which the current attacker was directly involved will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than in cases in which the current attacker was not directly involved" (1988b, 55).
Second, concerning past encounters with the current challenger, Huth argues that diplomatic put-downs and diplomatic defeats (defender bullied or caved in) should be related to immediate deterrence failure, whereas stalemates produced by firm-but-flexible bargaining should be related to successful immediate deterrence in the later crisis. For put-downs, the idea is that the challenger will be left unhappy with the status quo, and determined to protect its bargaining reputation and avoid another retreat before the defender. For diplomatic defeats, Huth (1988b) argues that, as apparently happened for Britain and France after Munich, backing down "weakens the defender's future credibility," making the challenger more likely to disregard future threats. For stalemates, Huth simply conjectures that a record of firm-but-flexible bargaining will stand the defender in good stead in a subsequent crisis (p. 55).
In sum, Huth argues that variables measuring the defender's past bargaining behavior will allow at least a partial empirical test of a contentious issue in the field of security studies-how important is reputation? He hypothesizes that reputational considerations will matter less than Schelling (1966) and others have suggested, but will nonetheless play a role in determining both the motivation of challenger and the inferences it draws from a defender's threats.
On balance, the empirical results appear to support the hypotheses. Past behavior matters only when the earlier conflict involved the current challenger. And when the defender had either bullied the challenger or caved in to its demands, immediate deterrence was significantly less likely to work. However, the data provide no support for the hypotheses that stalemates and a record of firm-but-flexible bargaining will improve one's chances for dissuading a challenger in subsequent encounters.
A closer look at how these results emerge calls this interpretation into doubt. Consider the proposition that how the defender bargained in its most recent conflict with the current challenger matters. Huth assesses this by looking at the relationship between immediate deterrence outcomes and the dummy variable for each of the three broad styles of bargaining and crisis outcomes he identifies: diplomatic put-down (bullying); diplomatic defeat (highly conciliatory); and stalemate (firm-but-flexible bargaining by the defender). Each variable is coded 1 if the defender used this style in aprevious crisis with the same challenger. It is coded 0 if either (1) there was a past confrontation but the defender used one of the other styles, or (2) there was no past confrontation between the challenger and defender in question. Thus there is a set of cases in the data set that are coded 0 for all three dummy variables-these are the cases for which there was no previous confrontation between defender and challenger.
When the three variables are included with Huth's other preferred independent variables, the logit results reported in Table 8 appear. Note that all three bargaining styles/past crisis outcomes have a negative impact on immediate deterrence (although the estimated effect of stalemate is only a bit more than one standard deviation from zero). The reason becomes clear with a little thought. The effect of these variables is negative relative to the cases in the excluded category-that is, relative to the cases in which there was no previous crisis between defender and challenger. It follows that the correct interpretation of the significant negative coefficients for diplomatic put-down and diplomatic defeat is not that how the defender bargained or the outcome of the last crisis matters. Rather, these coefficients indicate simply that, compared to cases with no prior conflict, immediate deterrence was less likely to work when there was a prior crisis and one of these bargaining styles/ outcomes obtained.
The appropriate way to test if the defender's bargaining style in the last crisis matters is to ask whether there are significant differences between the coefficients for the three dummy variables. Do the data allow us to reject the hypothesis that bullying, conciliatory, or firm-but-flexible strategies all have the same effect on the chance that the defender's threat will work in the current crisis? The appropriate statistical test is an Ftest of the null hypothesis that the three coefficients are the same. When applied, this indicates that there is about a one-in-three chance that coefficients this different would appear if the null hypothesis were correct. So the data really do not allow us to reject the possibility that it does not matter how the defender bargained or what outcome resulted in its last confrontation. It may matter, but the data do not provide firm evidence.
What the data do suggest is that it matters whether the defender and challenger had a previous crisis encounter, consistent with hypothesis 3 above. Immediate deterrence failed in only 2 of the 18 cases where there was no prior crisis between defender and challenger (11%), as opposed to 18 of the 40 cases with a history (45%). If we construct a new independent variable-past crisis, coded 1 when there was a prior crisis between defender and challenger, and 0 otherwise-we find that it has a significant independent effect on immediate deterrence failure, as seen in the logistic regression reported in Table 9.21 21. The results do not change if we include all of the independent variables for which this analysis has found a theoretical and/or empirical rationale for inclusion (see Fearon 1992, chap. 6). This empirical pattern is more plausibly explained by selection effects produced by strategic behavior than by considerations of bargaining reputation. The fact that the defender was willing to resist or challenge on the same (or a related) issue in the past is an ex ante indicator of the defender's willingness to use force (relatively high wD in the model). As such, a previous crisis implies, for a subsequent crisis, a greater initial belief that the defender might resist, and hence a lower chance immediate deterrence will succeed.
What is slightly counterintuitive here is that regardless of how the defender acted or the outcome of the previous crisis, challengers' prior beliefs should on average be less optimistic in the set of cases with previous conflicts than in the set without. Thus, even when the defender "caved in" in the previous crisis, any subsequent challenge will be made with an initial belief higher (on average) than for cases with no prior crisis. This is a consequence of costly signaling and the properties of equilibrium in the model. The fact that a state was willing to try resistance, even if it ultimately made concessions, reveals a higher willingness to use force on the issue than if the state had not resisted at all (and no crisis had occurred). In other words, regardless of the outcome, the fact that a past crisis occurred suggests that there is at least one issue on which both states have higher than normal values for conflict. In turn, this implies that a subsequent challenge will be made with a higher initial belief about the defender's willingness to resist, which implies that immediate deterrence will be less likely to work.22 In sum, the empirical relationship observed in the cases is not between immediate deterrence and the defender's bargaining behavior in its last crisis with the current challenger. Although it may be true, the data do not provide significant support for the hypothesis that bullying the challenger makes the state more eager to defend its "bargaining reputation" the next time around, or that being highly conciliatory leads the challenger to discredit the defender's threats in subsequent crises. Rather, the empirical relationship measured by the past behavior variables is between the fact of there having been a previous crisis and subsequent immediate deterrence failure. Strategic dynamics arising from costly signaling may explain this relationship. This argument casts a somewhat different light on the remaining findingthat immediate deterrence is unaffected by how the defender bargained in past crises with states other than the current challenger. This result does indeed undercut a strong claim about challengers' perceptions of the interdependence of commitments. If potential challengers drew strong inferences about an adversary's resolve from its behavior in unrelated conflicts, then we might well expect an effect of such behavior on immediate deterrence.
However, if there is no clear link between immediate deterrence and how the defender bargained in a past crisis with the same challenger, then it is not at all surprising that crises with other states have no apparent influence. Based on the preceding data analysis, I would argue that the key to understanding variation across cases in immediate deterrence outcomes is each side's prior expectations about the importance to the other side of the issues at stake. When the data are analyzed in light of the equilibrium results sketched in the second section, a different set of conclusions emerges:
1. Although the capacity to blunt a rapid offensive may make general deterrence more likely to succeed, its apparent effect on immediate deterrence is not due to the specific military attributes of the balance. Rather, when the defender is relatively strong, challengers tend to threaten on issues on which a concerted response by the defender is quite uncertain; hence a costly signal in response is likely to work. 2. Possession of nuclear weapons does appear to be related to immediate deterrence success, not because challengers have feared nuclear escalation but again because of selection effects. States are unlikely to challenge nuclear powers on issues perceived to be important to them. Instead, challengers will tend to threaten nuclear powers over issues on which a concerted response by the defender is initially quite uncertain, and hence a costly signal in reply is more likely to work.
